

Good evening, FANs! Okay, so you're probably asking yourself, "Hey! just wait one minute! This newsletter comes out on Friday or Saturday, so what's going on?" Well, in case you're really asking yourself that question, here's what's going on. Here at Artemus Central's publishing office, we're getting ready for a wedding. You know, one of those "Big, Fat, Greek weddings". Yes, Manny's son, Constantine will be marrying his sweetheart, Julie Swerbinsky on Saturday, June 11 in Charlottesville. So, as you can imagine, the hubbub of prepping for a wedding simply requires that the FANs Weekly Summary be delivered to you BEFORE Manny and Demetria leave for C'ville on Thursday. Sigh. I'm tired just thinking about it all! Anyway, we'll be adding a few photos of the wedding in our next newsletter, for sure. But...there's a lot of good fodder for this week's communique, so without further ado, we bring you this week's "FANs Weekly Summary"!

Ukraine - Some Observations from History

written and contributed by FAN, Scotty Skotzko

I am troubled that during this war I haven't heard more people talking about historical parallels. We are at a historical inflection point that I'm convinced will set the course of events for decades, perhaps centuries, in Europe and maybe elsewhere, and that most of the players in the West are missing the historical significance by looking for the quick fix and the exit ramp instead of thinking in terms of the long game. It takes a Kissinger or Brzezinski to look into the crystal ball and see what could be happening geopolitically. But, woe is us, we have no geopoliticians anymore; everybody is a tactician.

Speculating about how much of Ukraine can be carved off to achieve a "compromise" before the war has played out is exactly the kind of outrageous scheming I fear most from the faceless junior-league Wilsonians who are trying to direct foreign policy from behind the curtain at the NSC, i.e. the ones

feeding words into the teleprompter. We saw that kind of geopolitical gambling before, in Sudetenland in 1938, where Czechoslovakia's pledged protector, France (not to mention Russia), turned its back on Benes (who, like Ukraine, had a very able army which was mobilizing to fight, 47 divisions against Germany's 39), telling him he could expect nothing more from France (or Russia) and that his best option was to surrender the territory to Hitler. And then, of course, Hitler took Bohemia and Moravia six months later. I expect that eventually there will have to be compromise between Zelensky and Putin, but the terms for possible compromise will need to be defined by those two, based on what happens on the battlefield. There will not be an outright capitulation



by either side. Ukrainians will fight a war of attrition against the Russians. If the Russians cannot sustain the losses, they will gradually fall back and sue for a cease fire in place--and then remain in place for the next hundred years. If Kiev is overrun, as the Mongols did in 1240, the Ukrainians will consolidate in western Ukraine, around Lviv, historically the center of Ukrainian nationalism and cultural awareness, and will continue fighting an irregular war for as long as they can. A government in exile is not an option.

Zelensky will offer to compromise on whatever he must. What I fear most is outsiders telling him what he can afford to give up without it being appeasement,

and then slowly backing away from support in order to push him in that direction. I worry, that US policy shouldn't be heading in that direction. That would result in a duplicitous and pusillanimous policy. They've talked a good game to NATO so far, have provided assistance to Ukraine and have sanctioned Russia, but our preference seems to be to handle the issue from arm's length as much as possible. Ukraine is becoming yesterday's news. Politicians talk a good game but are starting to view Ukraine as a tar baby that they want to get off their hands as soon as possible. I sense that already there are those, here and abroad, who are looking for a way out. The war isn't a winning election issue like inflation. And between Russia and Ukraine, Russia is the more important consideration for them. What I don't hear them articulating is the geopolitical second-order effects of the Ukraine war, especially of a Ukrainian defeat. I don't think they realize that this war has jostled the post-War order in Europe, with unforeseen effects.



In geopolitical terms, what Zelensky has managed to achieve is a degree of national unity that is rare for Ukrainians, and probably the last thing Putin wanted to see emerge from this adventure. Zelensky wins by not losing. That means playing for time and hoping that internal forces in Russia will do what he can't. He's playing the long game and that means there's need for an uninterrupted supply chain.

What Putin has accomplished is to stir Germany out of its post-War lethargy. Project that 20 years into the future, and isn't that a wonderful prospect? An ascendant, assertive Germany, once more in

juxtaposition to Russia over the fate of Europe.

Zelensky is very cleverly trying to set the preconditions for negotiations that he knows will involve compromise. His strategy: Ukraine wins by continuing to fight and preventing Russia from winning. Unlike Russia, Ukraine is not fighting to take something but to keep something. That's an easier fight. When it comes to compromises, it seems to me he will make his own argument as to how the items he puts on the table are "not appeasement." I hope, he will not be coerced by third parties into their definitions of what is "not appeasement." So far, he has not been inclined to be an appeaser. His strategy seems to be to fight a war of attrition against the Russians that will return to the status quo ante. At that point talks about a settlement can begin--he's said as much: "return to where it all began and then negotiate on the future of the Donbas and Crimea." He's been very lawyerly in talking about what he will negotiate, nearly contradicting himself in spelling out what is immutable

for him while at the same time leaving some of the same items on the table for future discussion and potential compromise:

- He will not trade territory for settlement. Russia must withdraw from Ukrainian territory, there must be a ceasefire and security guarantees.

- But he is open to negotiations about "temporarily occupied territories"--Crimea and Donbas. A diplomatic resolution "might take 10 years." He is "willing to meet some Russian demands on

condition that there is a referendum and third-party security guarantees."

- He will forego NATO membership because he recognizes that Ukrainian membership is more than NATO can swallow. But in its place he wants a "new security framework" with "prevention measures" that will guard Ukraine against future aggression. To this end he's open to a "Versailles-like conference" that could include PRC, Israel, Ireland, etc., and that would make them guarantors of Ukrainian security. (He says "the US is considering the proposition.")

For Putin, this must be as frustrating as haggling with a rug merchant. He is not taking the lead in

setting terms. If he follows the Ukrainian lead for negotiations, he does not gain much leverage from his military superiority. If he agrees to Zelensky's terms for negotiations, he loses. Putin has demanded Ukraine not join NATO, must remain neutral, must be demilitarized, and must give up claims to Crimea and Donbas. Zelensky can say that he's agreeable to discussing all these demands except demilitarization. So, if anybody is vulnerable to getting advice from the outside on what he can give up "without it looking like appeasement," it's Putin. But what outsider is prepared to tell him that?

The best Plan B for Russia, after failing to achieve a quick collapse of Zelensky's government, is to divide Ukraine into occupied and unoccupied territories, i.e., "we'll hold what we have and discuss what you have." That would result in the equivalent of the Polish Partition and probably would last just as long. This is why Zelensky must resist proposals from outsiders to agree to a ceasefire-in-place. Viz. Berlin and Vienna. There was even talk several weeks ago that a proposal to divide Ukraine into three parts was raised by someone as a formula for peace. For his part, Putin needs to hold on to as much territory as he can if he is to justify his actions and show at least some strategic gains.

More surprising than how the Ukrainians are fighting this war is how Russia is fighting it. Their field doctrine seems not to have changed from WW II--all mass and weight, no combined arms operations and certainly not maneuver warfare. No flexibility, no nuance. Their preferred scheme of attack is to use indirect fires and then follow up with tanks and massed infantry. Their favorite tool is still the MRL. Level the target and then storm it. Tactically, this seems to me not too different from medieval mob armies, or the Mongol style of warfare. Four vulnerabilities are particularly exploitable by the Ukrainians. (1) Poor tactics--where did the Russian army get the idea that massing armor, troops and supply lines in close proximity to each other was

tactically sound? (2) Poor command discipline--troops not trained to operate together at the squad level, an ineffective and inexperienced NCO cadre, and generals who apparently have felt they must lead from the front--and get themselves killed. There are now reports about pockets of troops being left behind as the Russian army withdraws, troops and commanders refusing orders to go into combat, troops killing officers, and even officers committing suicide. (3) Poor battlefield mobility--one historical parallel might be Braddock at the Monongahela where he could not bring his firepower to bear on a small, mobile and concealed target. (4) Poorly maintained equipment--there have been accounts that, aside the from the limited supply of top-end, state of the art, equipment, as much as 40% of the the rest of the stuff that they're bringing out of reserves to replace losses has to be reconditioned. This is not a first-world army on the ground.



So what will the Russians do? I expect it will be to repeat what they have always done--regroup, re-mass, and storm the enemy again. Keep doing that until they break through. A wrecking-ball strategy. Nothing too different from Finland, Stalingrad, Kursk or Berlin, except that the

Red Army was more disciplined in 1944 because it was more experienced and better led. But their mass is their vulnerability. The Ukrainians will need to continue fighting a dispersed, almost autonomous war, and avoid presenting a massed front to the Russians. To fight that kind of war requires a continuing need for ISR, intel support, cross-border EW support, air defense weapons and anti-armor weapons--what Zelensky the other day called "heavy weapons." I see that we finally got a couple of aircraft into Poland that are equipped with EW pods that can provide standoff EW support. I was asking 3-4 weeks ago why this couldn't be done.

Zelensky injected a couple of telling remarks into his interview with Fox last week that were largely ignored. Asked directly about whether there had been a slowdown in US supplies, he answered indirectly: "If we don't have 'heavy weapons,' (by which he means

sophisticated systems) how do we defend ourselves? 'Heavy weapons' will lead to talks," and he was sure that President Biden wanted talks and "wants the truth to win." "If transport continues to be delayed, then some will wonder if there is a game behind it. I don't want to believe that there is a game." That's a telling remark and strikes me as a confirmation of a slowdown.

Giving Putin part of Ukraine in the hope of solving the conflict will not solve the problem because, as Zelensky has pointed out, it does not make for appetite suppression. Putin is not looking for a piece of Ukraine because he wants the whole thing. He is not just after coal and steel in the Donbas or a land bridge from Crimea; he wants to obliterate the concept of a separate Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian culture. There is a strain of dark, almost mystical "Eurasianism" that might be fueling his motivation--the idea that Russia has always been an empire and Russian people are an "imperial people," that Russia is a Eurasian polity linking Russians with people of Turkic, Slavic, Mongol and Asian origins, that there is a historical connection between Eastern Orthodoxy and the Russian empire, that Ukrainian culture is not genuine but only an off-shoot of Russian culture and history, that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, that Ukraine was only a "purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state," that Ukrainian sovereignty is "a huge danger to all of Eurasia," and that Russia's new adversary is no longer just Europe but the whole of the "Atlantic." And therefore Ukraine must be extirpated. This claptrap has been promoted by self-styled geopolitical savants like Nikolai Trubetskoi in the 1920s, Lev Gumilyov in the 1980s, and Aleksandr Dugin in the 1990s, with the


Bremmer's "Biggest Risk of All"

contributed by FAN, Bill Amshey

Ian Bremmer writes in "[The Power of Crisis](#)" that the globe's three great threats are the next pandemic ... the climate emergency... and the unexpected impact of disruptive technologies:

"The speed of technological change is the biggest risk of all," writes Bremmer, president and founder of Eurasia Group. "Companies are now using artificial intelligence to figure out the most efficient ways to change human behavior in ways that profit them."

"New technologies are already changing what it means to be human."



"The lead US and Chinese tech companies are central players in the drama that will determine whether the world descends into a new Cold War or heads toward a much more hopeful future," Bremmer adds.

"No other non-state actors today or arguably in history have come close to this kind of geopolitical influence."

"We've reached a crossroads," Bremmer writes:

[U]nprecedented global challenges aren't lurking somewhere in our future; they're here today. Climate change will intensify, no matter what we do and its effects will be felt everywhere. Much of our planet is becoming hostile to life. The wealthiest countries and people will spend all they can to shield themselves from the worst effects of this unfolding calamity, but the upheaval and misery will continue.

On the Lighter Side: America's last Howard Johnson's restaurant has closed

The last surviving Howard Johnson's restaurant has closed.

Open for most of the past 70 years, the restaurant was located in Lake George, New York, a popular summer vacation spot near the Adirondack Mountains. The restaurant closed its doors in recent weeks and the property is up for lease, according to a local affiliate.

"Lake George is officially dead," a Howard Johnson's fan wrote on Facebook, adding several pictures of the abandoned restaurant. "Cobwebs on the door. Right before Memorial Day rush up here."

The longtime roadside staple had about 1,000 restaurants in the 1960s and 1970s, and it was once America's largest restaurant chain. Instantly recognizable for its orange roofs, the diners served 28 types of ice cream and became a part of American culture. "Mad Men" recreated the restaurant to film a scene.

But Howard Johnson in the shadow of and other fast-maximized efficiency supply chains. bought a crippled in 1985, selling brand's hotels and to Prime Motor Inn. the restaurants to they lost the "HoJo"

By last decade just Johnson restaurants the Lake George location, along with one in Lake Placid, New York, and another in Bangor, Maine. The Lake Placid restaurant closed in 2015, and the Bangor location shut its doors in 2016.



quickly found itself McDonald's (MCD) food chains that and better managed Marriott (MAR) Howard Johnson hundreds of the about 200 restaurants That company sold other chains, and name.

a handful of Howard were still operating:

The Lake George location has "seen interest" since it went up for lease late last year, reports News 10. The real estate listing for the 7,500-square foot property states a price of \$10.

Although the Howard Johnson restaurants are closed, the hotel chain is still alive and well. There are about 300 locations and it's currently owned by hotel giant Wyndham (WH).

Picture of the Week: PICTURE OF THE WEEK: "FLYING SHIP" OVER ASHBURN'S BEAVERDAM RESERVOIR

contributed by FAN, Steve Page



These vehicles start out on the water, but then increase speed and actually take to the air — skimming over the water on a cushion of air.

The Flying Ship Company says the autonomous — or unmanned — vehicles are the future of shipping. According to the company, they are 30-50 percent more energy efficient than planes and 10 times faster than boats.

WATCH THE VIDEOS OF THIS AWESOME MACHINE [HERE](#)

An unusual flying vehicle was photographed flying over the Beaverdam Reservoir in Ashburn on Thursday. And it turns out there's a fascinating story behind this identified flying object.

It's called a "flying ship" and it was a model prototype out for testing. It's being produced and piloted by the folks at The Flying Ship Company.


It's Back! "What FANs Are Buying"

contributed by FAN, Steve Jones

From an email sent to us by Steve:

"This is wild!!! Two years ago I bought a hickory "fighting cane" from a fellow by the name of Mark Shuey for the purpose of taking an exercise and training program. Now I see [Artemus FAN, Keith Melton] owns the Company!"


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cyber attack?



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Security Flaw Has
No Patch, but...



The NSA Swears It
Has 'No Backdoors'



Thanks for reading! See you again in a couple of weeks!